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VALUE CREATION VERSUS VALUE CAPTURE 
Towards a coherent definition of value in strategy: an exploratory study 
ABSTRACT 
Resource-based theory has tended to focus on the development and protection of valuable 
resources. What determines a valuable resource has received less attention. This paper 
addresses three related issues concerning value and valuable resources: what is value? how 
is it created? and who captures? We have tried here to integrate different strands of the 
literature to address these questions. We first argue that value is subjectively assessed by 
customers and that value is only realised at the point of sale. Secondly, we argue that the 
only source of value is labour performing heterogeneously and that value is created if this 
labour is artfully deployed with other resources. The paper ends arguing that value capture 
is determined by power relationships between economic actors. 
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Towards a coherent definition of value in strategy: an exploratory study 
INTRODUCTION 
The resource-based theory of the firm (RBT) (Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) argues that 
an organisation can be regarded as a bundle of resources (Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; 
Rumelt, 1984), and that resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and 
imperfectly substitutable (Barney, 1991) are an organisation’s main source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. However, whilst most of the contributions to this view have focused 
on the ease with which valuable resources can be imitated, less consideration has been paid 
to what makes particular resources valuable in the first instance. Most contributors start 
from an assumption of a resource’s value, and then proceed to consider issues of 
imitability. As Miller and Shamsie recently remarked “after years of interesting conceptual 
work, we are still at an early stage in knowing what constitutes a valuable resource, why 
and when” (1996539). This paper suggests that, in order to progress RBT a more precise 
and rounded underpinning theory of value is required to help us identify ‘valuable 
resources ’ . 
Accordingly, the paper addresses the following questions: what is ‘value’? how is it 
created? and who captures it? It opens with a review of ‘value’ in RBT, then, a few 
reflections about the nature of value are proposed, which in turn leads into a 
reconsideration of resource-based arguments about value creation. A theory of value 
generation is set out which concludes that the source of value and hence profits (as the 
proportion of value captured by the firm) is the artful deployment of labour with other 
resources. The paper then addresses the distinction between value creation and value 
capture. Here it is argued that although value is created by labour in action, value capture 
is determined by power relationships between economic actors. 
An underlying theme of the paper is that appearances often prevent us from 
identifying the essential relationships between economic actors, and that many of the 
problems and confusion in mainstream economic theorising stem from the inability to 
separate these two levels of analysis. 
WHAT IS ‘VALUE’? 
‘Value’ In Resource-Based Theory 
The major contribution of RBT has been the exploration of heterogeneous resource 
endowments and how these can be the source of advantage if competing firms are unable to 
imitate these resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Black and Boal, 1994; Mahoney and 
Pandian, 1992). In most contributions to the school, resources are assumed to be valuable 
(one exception being maybe Wernerfelt (1984) who defines resources as anything which 
could be thought of as a strength or a weakness of a given firm), and attention has been 
focused on isolating mechanisms that prevent rival firms from replicating the desired 
resource bundles (Rumelt, 1984). When the issue of valuing a resource is addressed, it 
tends to be discussed in broad, general terms. The few authors that have attempted to 
define the term ‘valuable’ tend to argue that resources are valuable in relation to a specific 
market environment (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). To cite Barney a resource is valuable if 
“it exploits opportunities and/or neutralises threats in a firm’s environment” ( 199 1: 105). A 
resource has also been defined as valuable if it either enables customer needs to be better 
satisfied (Bogner and Thomas, 1994; Verdin and W illiamson, 1994), or if it enables a firm 
to satisfy needs at lower costs than competitors (Barney, 1986 a; Peteraf, 1993). Barney 
also suggests that resources are valuable “when they enable a firm to conceive of or 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (1991: 106). 
Conner (1991) argues that, from a resource-based perspective “obtaining [above 
normal] returns requires either that (a) the firm’s product be distinctive in the eyes of 
- 
- 
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buyers (e.g. the firm’s product must offer to consumers a dissimilar and attractive 
attribute/price relationship in comparison to substitutes), or (b) that the firm selling an 
identical product in comparison to competitors must have a low cost position” (1991: 132). 
The argument that resources have value in relation to their ability, inter alia, to 
meet customers’ needs is consistent within RBT (see Aharoni, 1993 ; Aaker , 1989; Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990, 1994; W illiams, 1992). This then begs the question: how do customers 
judge the extent to which an existing product meets their needs, or whether a new product 
on the market would better meet their needs? In other words, how do consumers make 
judgements about the value, to them, of alternative products? 
sl 
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Assessing value 
Traditionally when looking at value and consumer behaviour, economists tend to refer to 
utility theory and to the notion of marginal utility. The theory states, essentially, that 
consumers spend their income so as to maximise the satisfaction they get from products. 
Total utility refers to the satisfaction deriving from the possession of a commodity and 
marginal utility refers to the satisfaction that people receive from possessing one extra unit 
of a good or the satisfaction lost by giving up one unit. Early neo-classical economists 
assumed that people were rational (the economic man) and as such assessed systematically 
and carefully the different available options before purchasing. However this position has 
been softened and it is generally held that “by and large, people spend their money on what 
they expect will give them most satisfaction” (Bach, Flanagan, Howell, Levy and Lima, 
1987192). 
The issue then, is how do people develop their expectations, how do they judge the 
utility they are going to get i.e. how do they judge the value of a product? The potential 
purchaser has to judge how the product’s attributes will satisfy hisI needs. Judgements are 
made in advance of the consumption of the product, so customers have to make inferences 
about the range of products on offer based on a variety of cues. Customers’ perceptions of 
the value of a good are based on his beliefs about the goods, his needs, unique experiences, 
wants, wishes and expectations. In other words, customers assess the overall value of a 
product on the perceptions of what is received and what is given (Zeithaml, 1991). 
Value perception applies to all purchasers and not only to final consumers: the same 
type of judgement, a subjective judgement is made by a manager when procuring inputs 
like machines, components and an employee’s labour time or by an individual when buying 
a fridge or a car. In a ‘consumer’ purchase, such as “I need a car therefore I buy a car”, the 
need may be fairly easy to define. In an organisation the need for a purchase may not be 
that clear, indeed it could be argued that the ‘need’ that is to be met with the purchase is 
‘profit making’ (Besanko, Dranove and Shanley, 1996). This seems rational and logical, 
but it requires the purchaser to have great insight into the cause-effect linkages between 
resource procurement and the ultimate delivery of profit. More reasonably, the procuring 
agent has to have some belief that the procured resource will contribute to the profitability 
1 He (his/ him) is used here to mean she (her). 
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o f th e  firm , a n d  th is  be l ie f  wi l l  b e  r o o te d  in  a  w i de r  se t o f be l ie fs  a b o u t h o w  th e  firm  
c o m p e tes , wh i ch  m a y  b e  fu r th e r  b o u n d e d  by  a n  i ndus try r ec i pe  (Hu ff, 1 9 8 3  ; J ohnson , 
1 9 8 7 ; S p e n d e r , 1 9 89 ) . 
V a l ue , o r  r a th e r  pe rce i ved  va l ue , c an  b e  t rans la ted in to m o n e ta ry  te rms : it c an  b e  
d e fin e d  as  th e  p r i ce  th e  cus tomer  is p r e p a r e d  to  p ay  fo r  th e  p r oduc t, if th e r e  was  a  s ing le  
sou rce  o f supp l y  (Col l is,  1 9 94 ) . Th is  j u d g e m e n t is b a sed  o n  th e  assessmen t o f th e  p r oduc t’s 
va l ue , c oup l e d  wi th th e  i nd iv idua l’s w i l l i ngness to  p ay . These  m o n e ta ry  j u d g e m e n ts c a nno t, 
th e r e fo r e , b e  m a d e  in  iso la t ion f rom  th e  w i de r  n e eds  a n d  econom i c  c i rcumstances  o f th e  
customer .  
O n ly i n  th e  r a r e  i ns tance o f a  monopo l y  supp l ie r ,  w h o  is cogn i san t o f th e  cus tomers’ 
va l ua tio n , a n d  w h o  can  p r i ce  d iscr im ina te  wi l l  th e  p r i ce  th e  cus tomer  is p r e pa r e d  to  p ay  ( in  
w h a t fo l l ows th is  p r i ce  is te r m e d  ‘to ta l  m o n e ta ry  va l ue’)  e q u a te  to  th e  p r i ce  th e  cus tomer  
ac tua l l y  pays . In  a l l  o th e r  c i rcumstances,  th e  p r i ce  pa i d  wi l l  b e  less th a n  th e  to ta l  m o n e ta ry  
va l ue  pe rce i ved  by  th e  customer .  T h e  d i f fe rence b e tween  th e  cus tomer’s va l ua tio n  o f th e  
p r oduc t, a n d  th e  p r i ce  pa i d  is ‘c onsume r  su rp l us  ’ . E xp ressed  dif ferent ly, th e  p r i ce  th e  
cus tomer  is p r e pa r e d  to  p ay  equa l s  to  p r i ce  +  c onsume r  surp lus.  C o n s u m e r  su rp l us  ( B ach  
e t al., 1 9 8 7 ; W h ite h e a d , 1 9 96 )  is w h a t c onsume rs  co l l oqu ia l l y  ca l l  va l ue  fo r  m o n e y . 
Cus tome r s  choose  th e  g o o d  th a t wi l l  c on fe r  o n  th e m  th e  la rgest  c o nsume r  surp lus.  
T h e  chosen  p r oduc t m u s t th e r e fo r e  b e  d i f ferent ia ted in  ways  wh i ch  a r e  va l ued  by  th e  
customer ,  it m u s t de l i ve r  m o r e  c onsume r  su rp l us  th a n  a l ternat ives.  ‘V a l ue  fo r  m o n e y ’ can  
b e  i nc reased  by  e nhanc i n g  th e  pe rce i ved  va l ue  o f th e  g o o d  ( a nd  th e r eby  i nc reas ing  its to ta l  
m o n e ta ry  va l ue , th e  a m o u n t th e  cus tomer  wou l d  b e  p r e pa r e d  to  p ay  fo r  it), whi lst  k eep i n g  
th e  p r i ce  a t th e  s a m e  level ,  o r  by  keep i ng  th e  pe rce i ved  va l ue  cons ta n t b u t r educ i ng  th e  
pr ice,  o r  by  d o i n g  b o th  sim u ltaneous l y . 
The amount of consumer surplus that a customer can enjoy can only be assessed at 
the point of sale (it is at this point that the customer knows the selling price, he can value 
the product and decide then whether it is worth buying). Customers can only value what 
they perceive, this implies for instance that they are unable to value most inputs to the 
production process. This means that customers cannot consciously ‘reward’ or compensate 
any inputted resources, or any suppliers of those resources (we take up this point later). We 
could note here that this is different from other approaches, notably Hunt’s, who states that 
perceived value “depends on (a) the tastes and preferences of consumers in the segment and 
(b) the resources that produce the offering” (1995:323) (emphasis added). 
One consequence of this argument is that value cannot be ‘passed on’ in the 
production process: value is perceived by the customer at a point in time, it is assessed at 
the point of decision to purchase. This applies to all types of purchases, for example, the 
value of a numerically controlled lathe, a computer, or a truck is also realised at the point 
of purchase. It is not transferred into the organisation’s production or distribution process. 
It is an accounting convenience to assume that the values of inputs are passed on to 
customers. In reality many purchased resources do not ‘add value’ in ways that a customer 
can perceive. That is not to say that the purchased input was not valued. It was. It was 
valued by the manager who decided to buy it on behalf of the firm, but as soon as the 
machine was bought, all its value was realised. 
Another implication of this discussion is that any firm, that is able to sell something, 
is, in the eyes of its customers at one particular point in time supplying a unique and 
superior package of value for money, i.e. customers at this point in time perceive that the 
firm allows them to enjoy the largest amount of consumer surplus. From the customers 
perspective the selected item offers more consumer surplus than any other. For these 
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custom ers, the com petitors are not supplying an equivalent product/price com bination. In 
this restricted technical sense, each firm  is a m onopoly supplier to its custom ers at the tim e 
of the sale. Hence, it could be said that any firm  that sells anything has a tem poral 
‘com petitive advantage’. 
Clearly, som e custom ers will have found it quite difficult to m ake a choice; there 
m ay be products on offer which offer very sim ilar amounts of consum er surplus to the 
chosen product. These suppliers of close substitutes would constitute the direct com petitors 
to the firm . However, products offering significantly lower surplus could not be classed as 
close substitutes, and are therefore not credible com petitors. This view of ‘value’ helps us 
define com petitors, and hence m arkets and industries. This m ay lead to quite different 
industry definitions from  those derived from  conventional, product-based approaches. 
M arkets are never static. They exist at a m oment in tim e when a transaction takes place. 
Indeed, it m ay be unhelpful to conceive of ‘m arkets’ at all as this can imply som e 
perm anence or stasis in what is a dynam ic, atom istic and continuing evolving set of 
individual transactions. 
HOW IS VALUE CREATED? 
Value is realised when a sale is made 2. Sales are achieved when customers view that a 
product confers more consumer surplus than other viable alternatives. So firms create value 
through the production and sale of products. 
In line with RE3T arguments, if all inputted resources are homogeneous, and freely 
traded, competing firms will produce identical products, incurring identical costs of 
production. Thus all firms in this market would produce identical amounts of value. This 
equates with neo-classical perfect competition. 
However as argued above, in order for a firm to sell anything, there must be some 
buyers that rate the firm’s offering as providing superior consumer surplus than competing 
firms’. So even if the prices are identical, in order to make a sale there must be some 
perceived differences in the products on offer. This might have to do with the product 
surround rather than the product itself (i. e. the product is readily available locally, it is 
marketed more attractively etc.). Alternatively, one can have more consumer surplus 
because of a lower price, and to sustain lower prices the firm must be able to produce the 
same products as competitors but at lower cost. 
This implies that the source of differential consumer surplus must be somewhere 
within the transformation processes inside the firm. If factor markets are homogeneous, this 
can only occur if certain resource inputs are capable of performing heterogeneously within 
the production process, otherwise we have to relax our assumptions of perfect factor 
markets. 
* The exchanges of valuable goods that do not involve a monetary transaction are without the scope of most 
forms of economic enquiry. 
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Proponents of RBT argue that human or ‘cu ltural’ resources are the sources of 
above normal returns, not purchasable and tradable phys ica l assets (Castanias  and Helfat, 
1991; W ernerfelt 1989; Barney, 1986a). Inanimate objec ts  are incapable of transforming 
themselves into anything other than what they  are, they  need to be activated, worked on 
before they  can contribute to the provis ion of va lued products in. This  suggests that the 
sources of positive differential va lue derive from the actions of labour (Lad0 and W ilson, 
1994; Pfeffer 1995; W r ight, McMahan and McW illiams , 1994). Even though labour may 
be traded assuming its  homogeneity , it has the capacity  to be var iable in action. This  
implies  that labour is  the source of firm heterogeneity  and hence can be the source of va lue. 
However labour can create differential va lue only  if it performs heterogeneously. Indeed 
homogeneous labour3 work ing with homogeneous resources can only  produce 
homogeneous products. 
How can we judge which sources of heterogeneity  are va luable? There is  ample 
ev idence of firms with s trong cu ltures , with powerful and idiosyncrat ic  ‘ways of doing 
things ’ that have failed (Peters, 1988). Indeed ‘organisational inertia’ (Collis , 1991) and 
most of the blockages to s trategic  change seem to s tem from the embedded routines  and 
cu lture (that in effec t have become ‘core r igidities ’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992) of the 
organisation. It is  the judgements about how labour should heterogeneously perform that 
are the ultimate source of differential va lue, i.e. it is  the artful deployment of labour, w ith 
other resources, that it is  the source of va lue. In other words it can be argued that it is  the 
s k ill in knowing what resources to deploy , what resources to combine and how, and the 
judgements  about what va lues  should be attached to products, and for what markets, that is  
3 Some sk ills  are generic, some abilities  deliver output that are measurable and that can c learly be imitated 
such as, to c ite just a few, phys ica l strength, speed of typing or report wr iting sk ills. 
the source of value differentials. This skill is often referred to as business acumen or 
entrepreneurial flair, and to use Miller and Shamsie’s vocabulary (1996) it is a ‘systemic 
knowledge-base resource’ or to use Black and Boal’s (1994) a ‘system resource’. As this 
entrepreneurial resource is typically hired in any established business, artful deployment 
could be regarded as a qualitative variant of hired labour. We shall refer to this source of 
differential value as the art&Z deployment of resources. It is a quality within the firm that 
enables it to differentiate its products, and/or to lower its relative costs. So when a sale is 
made it is the result of a temporal advantage created by the actions of heterogeneous 
labour, artfully deployed. 
To highlight this point and to refer to the idea of ‘core competences’ of the firm 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), core competences are not the source of differential value. It is 
the artful deployment of competences, not the competences per se, that matters. The same 
argument applies to other ‘valuable resources’ like brands, or reputations. A brand is only 
a source of profit if it is artfully deployed. This can be seen in cases where a brand has 
enjoyed a resurgence under different management (Rowntree’s confectionery brands under 
the management of Nestle; Miller beer under the management of Philip Morris). In many 
respects this is in the spirit of what Penrose wrote in 1959 (and highlighted recently by 
Tsoukas (1996) and by Grant (1996) emphasising that what mattered was coordination so 
far as to achieve knowledge integration): “it is never the resources themselves that are the 
inputs to the production process, only the services that the resources can render” (1959:25). 
Artful deployment is the skill of entrepreneurship. Blaug remarks upon “the strange 
disappearance of the entrepreneur from the centre stage of economic theory” (1985:459). 
The entrepreneur is treated in most mainstream texts as a fourth factor of production, 
behind land, labour and capital. The arguments advanced here would place the 
entrepreneur, or more precisely entrepreneurial behaviour (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996), at 
the heart of the value creating process. The Austrian school (Jacobson, 1992; Kirzner, 
1992)) and Schumpeter ( 19 12) in particular, take a similar view. Schumpeter ( 19 12) places 
entrepreneurship and its connection with dynamic uncertainty at the centre of economic 
inquiry, viewing the entrepreneur as the source of all dynamic change in an economy. 
So far we have concentrated on trying to understand what value is, and how it is 
created. To summarise: value is perceived by the customer and all purchases are 
subjectively assessed, even purchases of resource inputs. Moreover, in order for a firm to 
make a sale a customer must perceive that the firm offers more consumer surplus than 
competing firms. Hence all firms that sell anything possess a temporal advantage. Value or 
consumer surplus is created by the artful deployment of the heterogeneous actions of labour 
with other resources. 
ARTFUL DEPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES 
Artful deployment can have both explicit and tacit aspects. Explicit artful deployment 
encompasses entrepreneurial flair, the ability to spot a business opportunity and knowing 
how to exploit it. It includes differential capabilities in resource procurement (so maybe the 
firm can buy cheaper), resource deployment (we manage, combine our resources more 
efficiently), and value creation (we know how to make and sell better products). 
Tacit artful deployment refers to a situation where resources are being deployed in 
effective and efficient ways, but this skilful performance is not the result of a consciously 
developed set of rules or the result of a clearly understood organisational routine (Nonaka, 
1991, 1994; Reed and DeFillipi, 1990). The firm just happens to be doing the right things, 
it does not know exactly what causes its success. In other words the relation between its 
actions and its performance is causally ambiguous (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). This could 
be due to chance, or to deeply embedded cultural know-how that no single individual is 
able to explicitly recognise or articulate (Nelson and W inter, 1982; Spender, 1994). So to 
refer again to Barney’s (1986b) argument, special insights into the future value of a 
strategic resource would be an example of explicit artful deployment; luck or good fortune 
may be an example of tacit artful deployment. 
In all firms there are probably elements of explicit and tacit artful deployment. In 
old established firms, where the original founders have long since left the scene, artful 
deployment may consist of some cultural momentum built up over the years (Fiol, 1991). 
The more tacit the artful deployment the more secure the firm is in one sense: if the firm’s 
management do not understand what makes them successful, then others are less able to 
imitate them. As Lippman and Rumelt (1982) argue causal ambiguity “acts as a powerful 
block on both imitation and factor mobility” (1982,420) but the management of the firm 
becomes riskier. If we do not know what causes success, we may inadvertently change 
something that is critical (e.g. through delayering, downsizing, or the crude imposition of 
business process reengineering). Similarly, if we are not knowledgeable of sources of past 
success, and of impediments to future success, we cannot know either what to change, or 
what to change it to. 
So, because of causal ambiguity, it could be that the demise of firms is more to do 
with not knowing exactly what to change and what to change it to, than with any structural, 
or cultural rigidities. It takes a confident and knowledgeable executive to challenge and 
change embedded routines. Executives ‘generated’ through the firm’s culture may not be 
able to do so, it is difficult for an insider to realise what he, or his firm as a whole, takes 
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for granted. For this  reason, executives  that emerge from within are unlike ly  to be fully  
aware of, to explic itly  know the sources of artful deployment, and hence are like ly  to be 
unable to manage its  evolution. This  may partly  explain why, when faced with a downturn 
in performance, the typ ica l ‘knee-jerk ’ reaction is  to cut costs (Bowman and Ambrosini, 
1996). Cost cutting hardly  ever const itutes  an artful deployment of resources. It is  often a 
programmed response to a c r is is , taken without tak ing into account the true sources of the 
firm’s  current and poss ible future profit. 
Moreover, if tac it deployment is  at the origin of the firm’s  advantage then, crude 
cost cutting runs the r is k  of destroying the ve ry  sources of future profitability . There are 
cases where the incumbent executives, ‘managerially ’ competent but lac k ing flair and 
ins ight, are incapable of making the difficu lt entrepreneurial decis ions  required, or other 
cases where quite the wrong understanding of the source of advantage obtained, as when 
Coca Cola launched their new formula Coke. 
Tac it artful deployment is  enacted in the spec ial way certain tas k s  get performed: 
the way a particu lar sa lesman se lls , or a designer designs . So tac it artful deployment is  
most like ly  to be performed by hired employees. W hereas the archetypal entrepreneur is  an 
indiv idual w ith ins ight, marshalling land, labour and capital for the greater good of soc iety , 
in practice entrepreneurial behaviours are performed by hired managers. So whether artful 
deployment is  explic it or tac it, it tends  to be performed by hired employees. 
Hav ing set out an explanation of va lue, and its  creation, we now turn our attention 
to the capture of va lue. 
WHO CAPTURES VALUE, AND WHY? 
Peteraf distinguishes between the existence of rents and economic profits: “the existence of 
Ricardian rents is not sufficient for the firm to earn above average returns.. . .If the resource 
is not owned by the firm and the firm cannot appropriate some of the rents only the 
resource owner will benefit” (1994: 156). This neatly juxtaposes the difference between 
value creation and value capture. Resources may be capable of producing positive value 
differentials, but if the resource owner is able to capture this value and the owner is not the 
firm, firm profitability is not affected. 
Despite this important distinction between creation and capture, most contributors to 
the resource-based school focus their attention on barriers to imitation at the level of 
competing firms, rather than on the problems of retaining value within the firm. Their main 
concern is with the processes of capturing value from customers. Rumelt’s isolating 
mechanisms ( 1984)) Dierickx and Cool’s ( 1989) time compression diseconomies to 
imitation, and the increasing returns to the cumulative magnitude of the stock of the input, 
and Lippman and Rumelt’s (1982) causal ambiguity are all addressing the problems of 
value capture from customers. But, as Peteraf (1994) points out, there is no benefit to the 
firm if the value captured from customers is lost through resource suppliers bidding up the 
price of their resources to the point where they capture the differential value won from 
customers. 
Porter (1991) highlights the issue of value capture in RBT: “successful firms are 
successful because they have unique resources. They should nurture these resources to be 
successful. But what is a unique resource? What makes it valuable? Why was a firm able to 
create or acquire it? Why does the original owner or current holder of the resource not bid 
- 
the value away. 7” (199 1: 108). Barney’s (1986b) response to this last question is to suggest 
that, in strategic factor markets, firms competing for strategic resources have different 
expectations about a resource’s value. As a result they will be prepared to pay different 
amounts for the resource. The “special insights into the future value of strategies” (Barney 
1986b: 1232) that the bidding firm has, enables it to acquire valuable resources at low 
prices; or alternatively, through good fortune (‘luck’), the firm happily discovers that a 
resource has considerably more value than anticipated when it was purchased. 
We argue that value capture from customers is determined by the bargaining 
relationships between the firm and the customer. The presence of close viable substitutes 
reduces the firm’s ability to capture value in the form of high prices; because the customer 
can exercise choice this enhances his bargaining power. 
The availability of close substitutes reduces prices and increases consumer surplus. 
The ease with which other firms can compete with close consumer surplus offerings will 
depend upon how easily they can amass the resources required to replicate, imitate or 
surpass the firm’s position. The more unique the resources employed by the firm, the easier 
it is for the firm to bid up its prices and capture more value. These resources are the source 
of heterogeneous value creation. Moreover, as we argued earlier, they cannot be 
commodities themselves i.e. homogeneous and freely traded. Only resources capable of 
heterogeneity can be a source of heterogeneous value creation, and, the only resource 
capable of this variability is labour. 
How much of the captured value is retained by the firm? This depends upon the 
bargaining power of the resource suppliers: if suppliers are cognisant of their resource’s 
value-creating contribution and they can ‘hold up’ the firm, then they are able to capture a 
larger share of value (Kotowitz, 1989; Will iamson, 1975). Porter argues as follows: 
“. . valuable resources, in order to yield profits to the firm, have been acquired for less than 
their intrinsic value due to imperfections in input markets” (1991: 108). 
Note that it is quite possible that a resource supplier captures a proportion of value 
far in excess of that resource’s true, essential, contribution to the value creation process, 
and, of course, some resource suppliers will find themselves capturing far less value than 
they actually created, because of their weak bargaining power. This is a powerful example 
of the difference between essence and appearance. We shall now examine the differences 
between the appearance and the essence of relationships between the firm and two factors 
of production: suppliers of labour and suppliers of capital. 
Value Capture: Suppliers of Labour 
Although the actions of certain types of labour are the sole source of differential value 
(Pfeffer, 1995)) the value that this labour creates is not usually captured by the sellers of 
the labour. This is because of the nature of the market for most types of labour. If it is in 
abundant supply, i. e. there are many very close substitute suppliers, then the bargaining 
power of the seller of labour is negligible. However, although both the seller and buyer of 
labour may perceive that the purchased contribution is homogeneous, as we have argued, 
the labour in action in the specific context of the firm becomes heterogeneous (Conner, 
1991). This masks the true contribution of labour. It also explains why labour power is the 
resource that is sold by the employee; labour is sold in a form which disguises its variable 
contribution. The employer contracts to hire labour hours, a fixed amount that can be 
priced (per hour, day, week, month etc.). Once hired, the variable contribution of labour is 
manifested. So what was in appearance a contract to supply a fixed amount of labour, 
becomes in essence an opportunity for the employer to extract a variable amount of value. 
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Ho l d  u p  d oes  n o t occu r  usua l l y  b ecause  th e  con t r ibut ion o f speci f ic  l a bou r  is 
obscu r ed . T u s h m a n  a n d  Ne l son  exp l a i n  th a t “techno l og i ca l  c h a n ge  o p e r a tes  to  f r a gmen t 
wo rk , desk i l l  l a bou r , a n d  re in fo rce  th e  p owe r  o f th e  ex is t ing bu r eauc racy” ( 1 9 90 : 1 ) . T h e  
d iv is ion  o f l a bou r  a n d  th e  g loba l i sa t i on  o f p r o duc tio n  r e nde r  it a lmos t imposs i b l e  to  d r aw  
l inks b e tween  th e  ac tio ns  o f th e  i nd iv idua l  se l le r  o f l a bou r  a n d  a  va l ue  g e n e r a tin g  o u tp u t. 
A s B l aug  exp la ins :  “th e  e m p l o y m e n t c on tract u n de r  cap i ta l ism  is i n  fac t ‘i n comp l e te ’ in  th e  
sense  th a t it s t ipu lates th e  r a te  o f p ay  fo r  l a bou r , a n d  th e  hou r s  o f wo rk  o f l a bou r , b u t fa i ls  
to  lay  d o w n  th e  intensi ty o r  qua l i ty  o f th e  l a bou r  th a t is to  b e  pe r fo r m e d . G iven  th e  
cha rac te r  o f p r o duc t ive p rocesses,  it is on l y  ra re ly  th a t it is poss ib l e  to  a ttr ibute o u tp u t to  
i nd iv idua l  workers ;  h e nce  tim e  wages  a r e  m u c h  m o r e  c o m m o n  th a n  p i ece  wages” 
(  1 9 8 5 :2 43 ) . B u t th e  con tract to  supp l y  l a bou r  p owe r  is necessa r i l y  i n comp l e te . L eav i n g  
de l i be ra te ly  v a gue  th e  con t r ibut ions o f th e  se l le r  o f l a bou r  p owe r  a l l ows o the r  
in te rp re ta t ions o f th e  essen tia l  re la t i onsh ips  b e tween  th e  emp l oye r  a n d  th e  emp l o y ee . 
The r e  a r e  c i r cumstances  whe r e  th e  se l le r  o f a  pa r t icu lar  type o f l a bou r  is 
p a r t icu lar ly awa r e  o f its u n i q ueness  a n d  is consc ious  o f th e  lack o f pe rce i ved  c lose  
subs titu tes . E xamp l es  wou l d  b e  mov i e  stars, to p  sa les  p eop l e , a n d  m a y b e  s o m e  p r o fessors!  
In  th e se  cases  th e  se l le r  o f l a bou r  is i n  a  s t rong  pos i t i on  to  ba r ga i n  u p  th e  p r i ce  o f the i r  
l a bou r . 
Howeve r  i n  m a n y  cases  th e  con t r ibut ion o f se l le rs  o f l a bou r  is n o t eas i ly  v is ib le.  It 
is n o tab ly  th e  case  fo r  i nd iv idua ls  th a t wo rk  as  pa r t o f a  te a m , whe r e  th e  c omb i n e d  resu l t  o f 
i nd iv idua ls’ con t r ibut ions is g r e a te r  th a n  th e  s u m  o f e ach  con tr ibut ion. Th is  m e a n s  th a t 
va l ue  is c r ea te d  by  th e  te a m  a n d  n o t by  th e  i nd iv idua ls  as  such . It is diff icult fo r  a n  
i nd iv idua l  se l le r  o f l a bou r  to  s ee  a n d  s how  th a t h is  c on t r ibut ion is a  d i f ferent ia l  abi l i ty. S o , 
th e r e  is a  d i f fe rence b e tween  essence  a n d  a p pea r a n ce . T h e  a p pea r a n ce  is o f th e  se l le r  o f 
labour being grateful for the job offer. The essence of the relationship is almost the reverse. 
W ithout the contribution of labour, the firm’s owners do not make profits. Hence, the 
essential relationship is the labour seller donating profits to the firm owner(s). So to 
summarise, it is the nature of the employment relationship, the trading of labour power not 
labour output, and the appearance of homogeneity of labour power that enables the firm 
owners to capture value created by the sellers of labour power. Maybe is it worth 
commenting that according to Aoki (1990) in Japanese corporations the value contribution 
of employees is seen in balance with that of resource suppliers, this could indicate that a 
shift from appearance to essence, i.e. to true relationships, may be possible. 
To return to Barney’s ( 1986b) arguments concerning strategic factor markets, even 
where all competing firms are aware of the value generating capability of labour, the price 
of that labour is not bid up because it is in relatively abundant supply. It is only where 
certain types of labour are perceived by buyers and sellers as distinct and heterogeneous 
that a bidding process ensues (e.g. transfers of football stars). 
It is important to note here that we are not making any distinctions between different 
classes of labour. Whether the labour power being sold is unskilled, skilled, managerial, 
involving physical work or ‘knowledge’ work is not important. The important relationship 
is between the seller of labour power and the purchaser of that labour power. The 
purchaser is the firm owner (or the shareholders), who may use hired agents (managers) to 
recruit, direct and control employees. Further, as we argued earlier, not all labour adds to 
total value. Some labour is employed in activities that are solely concerned with value 
capture, not value creation. Examples would be supervisory activities (to extract more 
value from the employee), and negotiating with resource suppliers (to secure lower input 
costs). 
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V a lue  C a p tu r e : Supp l i e r s  o f Cap i ta l  
In  m a ins t ream econom ics  tex ts th e  supp l i e rs  o f cap i ta l  c ap tu r e  a  sha r e  o f va l ue  e i the r  i n  th e  
fo r m  o f interest p a y m e n ts, o r  i n  th e  fo r m  o f d i v i dends  o r  g r ow th  o n  the i r  e qu i ty 
sha reho l d i ngs . Va r i o us  theo r i es  h ave  b e e n  a dvanced  to  exp l a i n  h o w  a n d  why  th ese  
supp l i e rs  o f cap i ta l  r ece ive  the i r  s ha r e  o f va l ue . S a m u e l s o n  a n d  No r d haus  n e a tly, th o u g h  
pe r h aps  i nadve r te n tly, s umma r i s e  th e  con fus i on : “to  th e  e conom i s t, p r o fits a r e  a  
h o d g e p o d g e  o f d i f ferent e l e m e n ts” (  1 9 8 5  : 6 6 0 ) . 
P ro fits a r e  v i ewed : as  impl ic i t  r e tu r ns  ( r en ts, r e n ta ls  a n d  wages  d u e  to  r esou rces  
o w n e d  by  th e  firm ); as  a  r ewa r d  fo r  r isk bea r i n g  ( d e fau l t r isk, a n d  p u r e  stat ist ical r isk); as  
a  r ewa r d  fo r  i n nova tio n  a n d  e n terp r ise;  as  monopo l y  r e tu r ns  ( the excess  r e tu r n  g a i n e d  by  
s o m e o n e  w h o  has  ma r k e t p owe r )  ( S amue l s o n  a n d  No r d haus , 1 9 85 ) . S im i la r  l ists a r e  
p r o ffe r e d  by  o the r  tex ts ( e .g . B a u m o l  a n d  B l inder ,  1 9 85 ) . M cGu i g a n , Moye r  a n d  Har r i s  
( 1 996 )  a d d  fr ict ion theo r y  (“th e  inab i l i ty o f o u r  e conom i c  system  to  ad j us t i ns tan taneous ly  
to  c hanges  in  ma r k e t cond i tio ns” 1 9 9 6 :7 )  a n d  th ey  a l so  a d d  th a t p r o fits a r e  r ewa rds  to  
excep tio na l  m a n a g e m e n t ski l ls. P ro fits h ave  a l so  b e e n  exp l a i ned  in  th e  pas t as  r ewa rds  fo r  
a bs ta i n i ng  f rom  cu r r en t c o n s ump tio n . 
In  m o s t m a ins t ream tex ts th e r e  is n o  a tte m p t to  eva l ua te  th e se  c o m p e tin g  theo r i es  o f 
p r o fit. They  a r e  typ ica l ly dea l t wi th i n  a n  add i t ive way . In  o the r  wo r ds , a l l  th e se  theo r i es  
a r e  d e e m e d  to  b e  cor rect  i n  th a t th ey  ‘exp l a i n’ d i f ferent p o r tio ns  o f p r o fit. Th is  p ro jects  a  
ve ry  con fu sed  p icture.  
A  c o m m o n  th e m e  in  th e se  theo r i es  is th e  n e e d  to  exp l a i n  p r o fits as  s o m e  sort  o f 
r ewa r d  fo r  s o m e th i ng  th a t is d o n e  fo r  th e  g o o d  o f e conom i c  society. W h o  consc ious ly  g ives  
th e  r ewa r d  is unc l ea r , as  th e  on ly  sou rce  o f cash  to  fu n d  th e  r ewa rds  flows  from  customers .  
Perhaps they are rewarding on behalf of society. Nonetheless, even if we accepted the 
notion of profits as a ‘reward’, and if we agreed that it was paying customers that conferred 
the reward, how can this come about? Customers can only reward what they perceive. 
They only usually perceive the finished product, the resources that were combined to 
deliver it are usually invisible, so they cannot be consciously rewarded. Moreover, are we 
rewarding the resource itself (the machine), the owner of the resource (the ‘firm’, or the 
shareholders?), the money capital that was loaned to buy the machine (loan finance), or the 
person who loaned the money? The notion of an inanimate object being rewarded is fairly 
absurd, but this does not trouble some economists. 
W ithin resource-based theory the language used takes the form of ‘rents’ rather than 
‘profits’ (Rumelt, 1987). If we were hoping for some more clarity in this stream of 
contributions we would be disappointed because the meaning of ‘rent’ differs across authors 
(Schoemaker, 1990) and for instance, Peteraf (1994) lists ten different types of rents: pure 
economic, quasi, appropriable quasi, Ricardian, land, inframarginal, efficiency, 
differential, entrepreneurial, managerial. 
Do we need to distinguish between capital that is advanced as an equity stake from 
that advanced in the form of fixed interest earning debt? Both suppliers of capital can 
capture a share of value; the difference is the lender of debt knows his share in advance. 
For instance firm owners can borrow all their capital from banks, which is why interest can 
be regarded as a deduction from the ‘profits’ of enterprise (Blaug, 1985). So the financing 
structure has an impact on value capture, but does it affect the creation of value? This 
largely depends on the ability of the firm to fund investments itself. The entrepreneur who 
is self financing concedes no portion of value to external parties (shareholders or lenders), 
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so it is only where the entrepreneur deems  it necessary to invest at a rate that cannot be 
sustained from  his own funds that external fund providers enter the picture. 
This explains a seem ing paradox in our argum ent. We suggested that sellers of 
labour are usually unable to capture m uch value because they are perceived by both parties 
as selling a hom ogeneous com m odity in abundant supply (labour hours). But if we apply 
the sam e argum ent to suppliers of capital, how is it that they are able to capture value? 
Suppliers of m oney capital are providing a com pletely hom ogeneous resource. Indeed there 
is nothing m ore hom ogeneous than cash, it is an essential quality that m oney m ust possess. 
Using argum ents about resource substitutability, suppliers of a com pletely 
hom ogeneous resource should capture equal and very low amounts of value. If they receive 
m ore than som e m inuscule return this m ust derive from  their bargaining power. But again, 
if they supply a com m odity, how can they bargain up the price of the m oney they lend? It 
m ust be not because the resource supplied is heterogeneous (because it isn’t); it m ust be 
because it is in controlled supply. Owners of spare cash that can afford to risk are usually 
facing a sellers’ m arket. So although the physical contribution of m oney capital is 
hom ogeneous, its restricted supply gives its owners power to capture a share of the value 
created by the firm . 
RBT focuses on economic profits (rents). These are profits that are in excess of 
those levels that are deem ed ‘norm al’. Norm al profits include returns to suppliers of capital 
(i.e. interest paym ents). These rewards to suppliers of capital m ust be sufficient to persuade 
the owners not to take their capital elsewhere. However, super-norm al profits can only be 
defined relatively, whereas profits could be defined absolutely (they are either realised or 
they are not realised). Here we get another source of confusion. Because super-norm al 
profits are a relative concept, we need to have som e benchm ark to assess them  against. The 
concern initially amongst industrial economists was to assure themselves that allocative 
efficiency across society was being achieved. This theorising relies on the neo-classical 
assertion that an efficient allocation of resources occurs where price is equated with 
marginal cost. Any market structures where this does not persist are ergo inefficient, hence 
to find these markets we need to define the boundaries of an industry. We also need to be 
able to measure firm performance in a way that reveals exploitative levels of profit. Often 
the convenient industry definitions chosen for these industry studies are product driven, but 
they would not necessarily make sense in our subjectively defined market environments. 
Thus, with regard to suppliers of capital, the essence of the relationship with the 
firm is that they supply a completely homogeneous resource, which is not capable of 
generating value. However because the resource they provide is in scarce supply, they are 
able to bid up the price of capital and capture larger proportions of value. The appearance 
is that suppliers of money capital create value. This is compounded ideologically with the 
notion of risk, and ‘rewards’ for risk bearing. But there are few personal risks involved, 
even if the investments yield nothing. The money is risked, the person who loans or invests 
it usually has other sources of income, and a varied portfolio of investments. 
CONCLUSION 
The contribution of this paper is an integration of several extant bodies of theory into a 
coherent explanation of value creation and value capture. We have tried to clarify a theory 
of value, and by distinguishing between the creation of value, and the capture of value it 
has developed further insights into the resource-based perspective. We argued that value is 
subjectively assessed by the customer and that consumer surplus is the criterion used by the 
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custom er in m aking purchase decisions. Entrepreneurial skill is required to identify and 
produce valued products at low resource cost. We have also suggested that when a firm  
sells to a custom er a tem poral advantage situation prevails and, if costs are skilfully 
m anaged profits result from  this situation. Resources per se are not the source of profits; it 
is their artful deploym ent that m obilises them  to exploit m arket opportunities in cost 
efficient ways that is the source of tem poral m onopoly profits. 
M arkets are dynam ic and unpredictable. As inform ation becom es m ore widely 
available, com petitors can expand their dom ains at the expense of the firm , through 
imitation, or by exploiting new innovations. This implies that artful deploym ent is a 
dynam ic skill, which helps the firm  to adapt to changing conditions. Where artful 
deploym ent is tacit the firm  is at risk of either unwittingly destroying a source of value, or 
by its inability to know what to change, and what to change it to. 
Although artful deploym ent is the source of value, bargaining relationships 
determ ine the capture of value. P rofit is value captured by the firm . This includes pure 
profit (econom ic profit), supranorm al profit, and interest. Although heterogeneous labour 
in action produces valued products which are the source of profits, the suppliers of this 
resource capture only a fraction of the value they create. 
The strength of the preceding argum ents lies in the fact that econom ic decisions are 
m ade on the basis of knowledge which it is reasonable to assum e each actor m ight possess. 
The value of products is assessed subjectively, based on the buyer’s perceptions of his 
needs and the extent to which alternative products m ight m eet those needs. Decisions about 
the procurem ent of inputs into a production process are based on beliefs about the 
usefulness of the resource in the value creation process. 
These propositions are in contrast to other forms of theorising. Neo-classical 
economics requires us to assume that entrepreneurs are cognisant of their firms cost curves, 
and the demand schedules of the customers in a market place. Transaction cost economics 
suggest that decision makers are aware of the relative costs of performing activities within 
hierarchies, or to establish market-based contractual arrangements. Experience of managers 
and executives operating in the real world strongly suggests that these assumptions may not 
hold. Despite some progress which has inched the theory of the firm closer to reality e.g. 
the contributions of Simon, and Cyert and March, vast tracts of economics activity in 
universities seems to hold to unrealistic neo-classical or quasi-neo-classical theorising. 
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